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A NO-STRIKE CLAUSE CAN SERVE AS VALID
CONSIDERATION IN TENURED
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' CONTRACTSBOND V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
At common law, strikes by employees, whether in the public or the private sector, were prohibited.' With increased union growth and pressure
during the New Deal era,' however, private sector employees were statutorily given the right to strike.' Public sector employees, on the other
hand, continually have been denied the right to strike.4 Most states, including Illinois, have not statutorily abrogated the common law, and strikes by
public employees therefore remain illegal. 5 As government employees, public school teachers are critically affected by this no-strike policy., The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly enjoined illegal strike activity by public

1. See United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 882 (D.D.C. 1971), af'd,
404 U.S. 802 (1971) ("At common law no employee, whether public or private, had a constitutional right to strike in concert with his fellow workers"); Jefferson County Teachers Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970) ("Under the common law it is
recognized that public employees do not have the right to strike or to engage in concerted work
stoppages"); Head v. Special School Dist., 288 Minn. 496, 507, 182 N.W.2d 887, 894 (1971) ("it
is clearly established common law that a strike by public employees for any purpose is illegal").
2. For a review of the legal developments in the private sector leading up to and including
New Deal legislation, see Feldman, The Illinois Judiciary and Public Employee Labor Disputes:
A Return to an Imperial Judiciary?, 53 Cm. -KENT L. REv. 619, 620-32 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Feldman].
3. The common law was superseded by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1976), which guaranteed the right to strike to workers in the private sector. The
genesis of this Act was § 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA), Pub. L.
No. 90-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). The Supreme Court held the NIRA unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The NLRA, however, was passed by
Congress the same year Schechter was decided, and after the court packing plan, the constitutionality of the NLRA was upheld by a bare majority in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4. See note 21 infra.
5. The first case in Illinois to explicitly consider the legality of strikes by public employees
was Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965). The court observed:
"[A]lthough this is a case of first impression in a reviewing court of this jurisdiction, it is, so far
as we can ascertain, the universal view . . . that a strike of municipal employees for any purpose is illegal." Id. at 571, 207 N.E.2d at 430. See notes 19-30 and accompanying text infra.
6. Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 74 Il. 2d 412, 426, 386
N.E.2d 47, 53 (1979) (public school teachers who are participants in illegal strike activity cannot
benefit at the expense of non-strikers); Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed'n of Teachers, 46 I11.
2d 439, 441, 264 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1970) (a strike by school employees is unlawful as it violates
the expressed public policy of this state), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971); Board of Educ. v.
Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 573, 207 N.E.2d 427, 431 (1965) (there is only a difference in degree
between striking teachers and striking custodial employees and the majority rule is that strikes
by all public employees are illegal).
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school teachers' in order to bring stability to the educational system of the
state. 8
Despite judicial decisions proclaiming public sector employee strikes
illegal, public employees nationwide have continued to strike.9 Nationally,
public school teachers have been among the most militantly defiant of the
courts.'" Illinois has ranked near the top in the number of public school
teachers' strikes since 1972," and the number of work days lost in Illinois
public education continues to climb. 2 Indeed, the growing frequency of
7. See City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 111. 2d 547, 553, 316 N.E.2d 513, 516 (1974) (injunction of
illegal teachers' strikes upheld); Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed'n of Teachers, 46 I11.2d 439,
446, 264 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1970) (upheld lower court's authority and duty to issue a temporary
restraining order). But cf. County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d 166, 170, 265 N.E.2d 141, 143
(1970) (a strike by employees of a not-for-profit hospital was not contrary to public policy and
therefore not enjoinable), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971).
8. The goal of providing stability is one of the main reasons the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted the no-strike policy. See notes 23-30 and accompanying text infra.
9. Since the middle of the 1960's, public employee strikes have multiplied, affecting every
aspect of public services. In 1960, there were 36 strikes by federal, state, and local government
employees idling 28,600 workers for 58,400 work days; in 1968, there were 254 strikes among
202,000 workers with 2,545,200 work days lost; in 1973, there were 387 strikes among 196,400
workers absented from 2,303,900 work days; in 1975, there were 478 strikes among 318,500
workers with 2,204,400 work days idle; and in 1978, there were 481 strikes among 193,700
workers producing 1,706,700 idle work days. [1980] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) RF-71:1014.
10. Strikes in education equal the total number of teachers' strikes for that year, plus the
number of strikes where teachers and nonprofessional workers participated together. Of the 387
strikes in 1973, 57.8% occurred in education; of the 478 strikes in 1975, 47.9% were in education; of the 378 strikes in 1976, 55% were in education; and of the 481 strikes in 1978, 55%
were in education. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN
GOVERNMENT, 1973, Report 437, at 9 (1975); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1975, Report 483, at 13 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1976, Report 532, at
12 (1978); [19801 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) RF-71:1022.
11. States with high levels of public sector strike activity tend to experience these high
levels consistently over the years. In a number of public school teachers' strikes Illinois ranked
fourth in 1972, third in 1973, fifth in 1974, second in 1975 and 1976, fifth in 1977 and third in
1978. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT,
1972, Report 434, at 9-11 (1974); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK
STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1973, Report 437, at 9-11 (1975); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1974, Report 453, at 9-11 (1976); U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1975, Report 483, at 13-16 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK
STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1976, Report 532, at 12-15 (1978); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1977, Report 554, at 12-15 (1979);
[1980] Gov'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) RF-71:1022-1025.
12. In Illinois in 1972 there were 20 strikes in education with 17,300 work days lost; in 1973
there were 19 strikes in education with 291,000 work days lost; in 1974 there were 19 strikes in
education with 14,300 work days lost; in 1975 there were 28 strikes in education with 354,000
work days lost; in 1976 there were 26 strikes in education with 20,600 work days lost; in 1977
there were 19 strikes in education with 16,700 work days lost; and in 1978 there were 28 strikes
in education with 63,800 work days lost. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1972, Report 434, at 9-11 (1974); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1973, Report 437, at 9-11
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teacher strikes and the absence of state legislation covering strike activity
and collective bargaining of public employees 11were two prime factors
prompting the Illinois Supreme Court to formulate and enforce the no-strike
policy.
In Bond v. Board of Education,' the Illinois Supreme Court took another
step to enforce the Illinois no-strike policy. The court held that a no-strike
clause may serve as valid consideration in a tenured public school teachers' I"
employment contract. 16 In its attempt to decrease public school teachers'
strike activity, the court, however, ignored 'established principles governing
the formation of all contracts.' 7 Furthermore, the court may have weakened
the bargaining relationship between school boards and public school teachers
at a time when future contract negotiations must run smoothly to avoid
further strike activity.' 8
(1975); U.S.

1974,

DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT,

453, at 9-11 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK
1975, Report 483, at 13-16 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU
STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1976, Report 532, at 12-15 (1978);

Report

STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT,
OF LABOR

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1977,
Report 554, at 12-15 (1979); [1980] GOV'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) RF-71:1022-1025.
13. Illinois lacks any legislation either prohibiting or allowing strikes by any public sector
employees. It has been suggested that such legislation has not been enacted because the Illinois
courts have willingly stepped into the legislative arena. See Feldman, supra note 2, at 619-20.
Furthermore, because Illinois lacks statutory authorization of public sector collective bargaining,
the courts are left to determine the permissible scope of collective bargaining agreements. The
Illinois Supreme Court has held that discretionary governmental powers can neither be restricted by collective bargaining agreements nor delegated to an arbitrator or third party. Board
of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers' Union, 74 Ill. 2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47 (1979);
Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers' Union, 62 II. 2d 470, 343 N.E.2d 473
(1976); Illinois Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 62 11. 2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7 (1975). See also
Eisenhammer & Trizna, The Permissible Scope of Public Sector Bargaining in Illinois: A Proposed Solution, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 509 (1979); Shaw & Clark, The Need for Public
Employee Labor Legislation in Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 628 (1971).
14. 81 Ill. 2d 242, 408 N.E.2d 714 (1980).
15. See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
16. 81 111. 2d at 249, 408 N.E.2d at 717.
17. Five elements are essential to all public school teacher employment contracts: (1) Authority of a school district to contract, (2) mutual assent of contracting parties, (3) valid and
adequate consideration, (4) definiteness, and (5) lawful subject matter. L. PETERSON, R.
ROSSMILLER & M. VOLY, THE LAW AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION 132-34 (2d ed. 1978). See
notes 91-93 and accompanying text infra.
18. For a basic overview of public sector labor negotiations and public employees' right to
strike, see Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79
YALE L.J. 418, 440 (1970) ("strikes by public employees inevitably distort the decision-making
process in the public sector"); Glink, Issues in School Labor Relations, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
627, 640 (1979) ("Where public employee strikes are prohibited, the weapon of strike nevertheless has been used often, but resulting settlements have been achieved at a cost of bitterness
and frustration") [hereinafter cited as Glink]; Shaw & Clark, Public Sector Strikes: An Empirical
Analysis, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 217, 233 (1973) ("There is an urgent need to develop greater competence on the part of those who represent public management and public sector unions .. .[to
avoid] many strikes which should have never occurred"); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1127 (1969) ("Legislation is
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PRE-BOND JUDICIAL FORMULATION OF THE
ILLINOIS No-STRIKE POLICY AND TENURED TEACHERS' RIGHTS

Illinois No-Strike Policy
The judicial policy declaring all public employees' strikes illegal in Illinois
is based on the three main propositions initially asserted in Board of Education v. Redding. 9 The first basis was the "[u]niversal view that there is no
inherent right in municipal employees to strike against their governmental
employer." 0 This position resulted from the widespread prohibition of public employee strikes in other states .2 Following the lead of these states and
in the absence of Illinois legislation expressly prohibiting public employee
strikes, the Redding court adopted the common law position that public employees have no "inherent right" to strike.'
The second argument advanced in Redding in favor of the no-strike policy
was derived from the 1870 Illinois Constitution.' According to the court, to
implement the state goal of providing free education to all persons, the state
has a constitutional obligation to provide "a thorough and efficient system of

needed [to construct a system of collective bargaining], for the problems we have explored
require solutions beyond the power of the courts to fashion") [hereinafter cited as Wellington].
19. 32 I11.2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
20. Id. at 571, 207 N.E.2d at 430.
21. As a general rule, public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work
stoppage against a public employer. See, e.g., Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138
Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951) (public school teachers do not have the right to engage in strike
activity); Teachers Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969)
(public school teachers may not engage in a strike for any purpose), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928
(1970); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958)
(teachers are agents of the government; to allow them to strike would be denying the authority
of the government). Similarly, federal employees do not have the right to strike. See, e.g.,
Arnell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158, 161 (1966) (government employees are forbidden from
exercising the right to strike); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 882
(D.D.C. 1971) (public employees, in the absence of a statute so providing, do not possess the
right to strike), affd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
22. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
23. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1870). That section provides: "The General Assembly shall
provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this state may
receive a good common school education." Id. (emphasis added).
The present constitution contains almost the exact language; therefore, adoption of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 since Redding has not disturbed the validity of that decision. For cases
upholding the validity of the Illinois no-strike policy after 1970, see notes 6 & 7 supra. The
1970 Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. COAL-FREE SCHOOLS
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of
all persons to the limits of their capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality educational institutions and services. Education in public school through the secondary level shall be
free. There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by
law.
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (emphasis added).
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free schools." '24 This duty, Redding stated, is discharged through the local
boards of education, which have responsibility for effectuating the consitutional mandate. 25 Strikes by public school teachers, therefore, directly conreduce the effitravene the Illinois Constitution because teachers' strikes
26
ciency and quality of the Illinois educational system.
The third argument asserted by the Redding court against permitting public employee strikes was that strikes impede and obstruct essential services
provided by the government.2 7 Recognizing that governmental services are
incapable of being replaced by alternative sources, the court concluded that
thorough and efficient school operations could not be subject to the choice
or whim of public school teachers." Furthermore, the court stated that as
governmental employees public school teachers are agents who fulfill the
will of the people and are therefore charged with a duty to refrain from
conduct which would tend to harm the educational system." These three
arguments-no inherent right of government employees to strike, the state
constitutional requirement of efficient and quality education, and the potential interference with essential governmental services-form the no-strike
policy as it presently exists in Illinois. In the last ten years, Illinois courts
have frequently utilized this no-strike rule to supress the growing number of
public school teachers' strikes.3

Tenured Teachers' Rights
In Illinois, tenured teachers have a vested contract right in continued employment with their boards of education. 3' Although section 12-11 of the
24. 32 lII. 2d at 572, 207 N.E.2d at 430. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1870).
2d at 572, 207 N.E.2d at 430; Bond v. Board of Educ., 81 111. 2d 242, 248, 408
25. 32 Ill.
N.E.2d 714, 716 (1980) (the responsibility for effectuating the duty imposed by the constitution
is delegated to the school boards); Allen v. Maurer, 6 11.App. 3d 633, 640, 286 N.E.2d 135,
140 (4th Dist. 1972) (the state has a duty, discharged through local board of education, to
provide the public with an efficient and high quality educational system).
2d 547, 553,
26. 32 Il. 2d at 572-73, 207 N.E.2d at 430-31; City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 I11.
316 N.E.2d 513, 516 (1974) (strikes by public employees create emergencies that affect the
health, safety, and welfare of the public); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 572, 207
N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965) (agents of the school boards are charged with a duty to refrain from
App. 3d
conduct that will render our schools less efficient and thorough); Allen v. Maurer, 6 Ill.
633, 640, 286 N.E.2d 135, 140 (4th Dist. 1972) (control of the education system by the school
board is necessary to achieve the constitutional mandate of free and efficient public institutions).
27. 32 11.2d at 572, 207 N.E.2d at 430.
28. Id. at 573, 207 N.E.2d at 431.
29. Id. at 572, 207 N.E.2d at 430. Closely related to the essentiality argument is the
sovereignty argument which is predicated on the belief that governmental employees are agents
of the government and as such are exercising a portion of the sovereign power. The sovereignty
argument declares that persons exercising a portion of this sovereign power have no right to
strike against the government. See Note, The Illinois Anti-Injunction Act is Not Applicable to
Strikes by Public Sector Employees and Such Strikes are Illegal Per Se, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 187,
195-200 (1978); Feldman, supra note 2, at 636-38; Wellington, supra note 18, at 1123-27.
30. See notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text supra.
31. The Illinois School Code, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 1-1-1214 (1979), provides that
tenured teachers, by definition, have a vested contract right in their employment: "Tenure. Any
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Illinois School Code specifically establishes the rights of tenured teachers
and the duties of the school boards," 2 judicial decisions have been essential
in delineating the precise meaning of certain Code provisions. The Illinois
Supreme Court in Richards v. Board of Educationm established boundaries
on the statutory authority of school boards over tenured teachers' salaries.m
The court held that a school board's otherwise discretionary control over the
salaries of its teachers is subject to the limits expressly established by the
School Code," and to the constitutional prohibitions of actions that are either
arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable, or based upon an improper
classification.'
While the court granted broad discretionary control to the

faculty member who has been employed in any district for a period of 3 consecutive school years
shall enter upon tenure ....
A tenured faculty member shall have a vested contract right in
continued employment as a faculty member .... " Id. § 103B-2 (Cumm. Supp. 1980).
32. Id. § 24-11. This portion of the Code is particularly relevant to tenured teachers and
was the basis in Bond for paying non-signers their previous year's salary. It provides in relevant
part:
Contractual continued service shall continue in effect the terms and provisions of
the contract with the teacher during the last school term of the probationary
period, subject to this Act and the lawful regulations of the employing board ....
Contractual continued service status shall not restrict the power of the board ... to
make such salary adjustments as it deems, desirable ....
Id. (emphasis added).
There are three other statutes within the School Code that specifically apply to the boards'
control over teacher salaries. "Duties of school board. The school board has the duties enumerated in sections 10-20-1 through 10-20-30." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20 (1979). These
duties include the appointment and employment of teachers, as well as the ability to fix
teachers' salaries. "Appoint teachers and fix salaries. To appoint all teachers and fix the amount
of their salaries subject to limitations set forth in this Act." Id. § 10-20.7. "Employment of
teachers. To examine teachers by examinations . . . and fix the amount of their salaries subject
to limitations set forth in this Act." Id. § 10-21.1.
33. 21 11. 2d 104, '171 N.E.2d 37 (1961).
34. The plaintiff in Richards was a full time tenured teacher. He filed an action for a
declaratory judgment seeking to test the authority of the defendant board of education to
combine its salary schedule with a program of professional growth. The schedule, which was
adopted for the 1958-1959 school year, accorded teachers with the plaintiff's experience an
annual raise of $400, provided the teacher had met the requirements of the professional growth
program. Plaintiff's challenge to the statutory authority of the school board prompted the courts
to define the board's powers under section 22-5 of the School Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §
22-5 (1957). 21 11. 2d at 107-08, 171 N.E.2d at 40-41. For the presently applicable sections of
the Code, see note 32 supra.
35. 21 111. 2d at 109, 171 N.E.2d at 41. The court found that:
There is no provision in the Code which denies to school boards the right to weigh
the factor of professional growth in classifying teachers and fixing their compensation but, on the contrary, the general purport of all the pertinent provisions and the
specific directions of a few strongly support a legislative intent to permit the discretion of the board to be exercised in such a manner.
Id.
36. Id. See note 37 infra.
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school boards, it also established the numerous rights to which tenured
7
teachers are entitled under the School Code.1
One of the more important rights the School Code confers on tenured
teachers is the right to refuse or accept a new contract offered to them by
the school board.'
Interpreting the School Code in Donahoo v. Board of
Education,3 the court made it clear that if tenured teachers refuse to sign a
new contract tendered to them by the board, they continue to be employed
under the terms of their previous contract.'
The court rested this holding
on the ground that tenure rights are necessary to protect qualified teachers
and to assure them that their employment depends upon merit and not
upon the partisan whims of individual school officials."
Two recent appellate court cases directly addressed tenured teachers'
rights: Davis v. Board of Education42 and Littrell v. Board of Education.'

37. 21 I11. 2d at 107-08, 171 N.E.2d at 40. See also Byerly v. Board of Educ., 65 I11. App.
3d 400, 382 N.E.2d 694 (4th Dist. 1978). In Byerly, the court held that the school board's
powers, authorized by the School Code, are broad enough to include the power to make payments to retiring teachers for accumulated sick leave. Id. at 403, 382 N.E.2d at 697. This
holding was founded upon the rule established in Richards that a school board has discretionary
control over its teachers' salaries, subject only to limits established by the School Code and the
constitution.
38. The applicable section of the Code affording tenured teachers this right to refuse or
accept a new contract is set forth at note 32 supra.
39. 413 Ill. 422, 109 N.E.2d 787 (1952).
40. Since plaintiffs were tenured teachers, they were not required to sign the new employment contracts offered to them by the board. As the court in Donahoo stated:
The Teacher Tenure Law does not make it mandatory . . . to either accept or reject
[the new contracts]. Of course, if an offer was properly made and unconditionally
accepted, it would be in force according to its terms, but if not accepted or conditionally accepted, then the provisions of the Teacher Tenure Law apply.
Id. at 427, 109 N.E.2d at 789-90 (1952). Yet, in Bagley v. Board of Educ., 83 Ill. App. 3d 247,
403 N.E.2d 1285 (3d Dist. 1980), the Illinois appellate court rejected the argument that tenured
teachers who refused to sign a new contract continued employment under the terms of their
previous year's contract. Id. at 251, 403 N.E.2d at 1289. The Bagley court asserted that Donahoo did not stand for the proposition that non-signing tenured teachers continued employment
under their prior year's contract because Donahoo dealt with a non-tenured teacher. Id. The
Bond court resolved this problem when it distinguished the rights of tenured and non-tenured
teachers. The court stated:
Under [the average employment contract], the employer offers a salary, the amount
being totally discretionary, in exchange for a particular job performance, and if the
employee is unwilling to accept the terms, employment may be terminated. A tenured teacher, however, has the option of declining the new contract and continuing
employment, under the provisions of the School Code, at a salary and according to
the terms of the prior year's contract.
81 111. 2d at 250, 408 N.E.2d at 717-18. The court then cited Donahoo to support this position.
Id. Therefore, Bagley has been impliedly overruled.
41. 413 Ill. at 425, 109 N.E.2d at 789. See also Hankerson v. Board of Educ., 10 Ill. 2d
560, 563, 141 N.Ed.2d 5, 7 (1957).
42. 19 Iil. App. 3d 644, 312 N.E.2d 335 (2d Dist. 1974).
43. 45 Ill App. 3d 690, 360 N.E.2d 102 (5th Dist. 1977).
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In Davis, tenured teachers" passed a resolution declaring that they would
not return to the classrooms in the fall unless a satisfactory contract settlement could be reached with the board. 45 Interpreting this action as a strike
threat, the school board mailed a new contract to all tenured teachers with
provisions including a salary increase, a no-stike clause, and other incidental
benefits.4 A follow-up letter was sent to non-signing teachers offering them
the option of signing the new contracts or continuing to receive their pre-

vious year's salary according to the provisions of the School Code. 47 The
plaintiffs, non-signing tenured teachers, returned to work in the fall for their
previous year's salary.4
The issue addressed in Davis was whether a salary differential between
tenured teachers who signed and those who refused to sign the new employment contract was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." The court
reasoned that because the option of signing was offered to all tenured
teachers and because the plaintiffs opted not to sign, they were not entitled
to receive the salary increases signatories received. 50 In short, the Davis
court held the salary increase not arbitrary or discriminatory, but based
upon a permissible classification-signatory or non-signatory of the new
contract. "'
Three years later, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District was
presented, in Littrell, with a case somewhat similar to Davis. On the first
day of the 1974-1975 school term, the school board offered contracts to all its
tenured teachers that incorporated a salary schedule the board had earlier
adopted. 5 The plaintiffs, tenured teachers employed by the school board,
opted not to sign the contracts offered to them 3 and were consequently paid
their previous year's salaries.m
44. 19 Ili. App. 3d at 645, 312 N.E.2d at 336. The Aurora Education Association, East, was
recognized by the school board as the tenured teachers' bargaining representative.
45. Id. This resolution was passed on June 9, 1971; the fall school term did not commence
until September 7, 1971.
46. Id. The new contract was mailed on June 21, 1971, approximately 78 days before the
start of the school term.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 646, 312 N.E.2d at 336. See note 37 supra.
50. 19 I11.App. 3d at 646, 312 N.E.2d at 336.
51. Id. at 646, 312 N.E.2d at 337. The Bond court agreed with the Davis holding and found
that "under the proper conditions, a salary distinction between signing and non-signing teachers
is not arbitrary or unreasonable." 81 Ill. 2d at 247, 408 N.E.2d at 716. The court did not specify
what those conditions were, but apparently they existed in Davis.
52. 45 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 360 N.E.2d at 103. The salary schedule adopted on July 8, 1974
was unlike any contract salary schedule prepared in previous years. Those previous years' contracts indicated the teacher's salary by the phrase "as per salary schedule." The new contract
listed fixed dollar amounts, based on experience and educational level, according to the schedule earlier adopted by the board.
53. Id. The plaintiffs did not sign because they did not want to be bound by a written
contract when they later attempted to negotiate raises.
54. Id. Each plaintiff received $415 less than teachers, with identical experience and education, who did sign the contracts.
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The Littrell court distinguished the Davis decision because in Davis the
contracts contained a no-strike provision' and, more importantly, because
the contracts in Davis were submitted to the teachers more than sixty days
before the beginning of the school term.6 By reason of this distinction, the
Littrell court held that paying non-signing plaintiffs less money than tenured
teachers who signed the new contracts was arbitrary and based upon an
unreasonable classification.5 7 The court concluded that the sole justification
for paying a lower salary to the plaintiffs was their failure to sign the new
contracts. This justification was deemed invalid, for even if the plaintiffs had
executed the contracts, they would not have bound themselves to do any
more than they were already obliged to do-in short, the contracts lacked
consideration.- The holdings of Littrell and Davis presented a conflict between districts of the appellate court which the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed in Bond.
FACTS OF BOND

On May 27, 1977, ninety days before the start of the school year, the
defendant board of education tendered individual contracts to its tenured
teachers, who had ten days to sign. 9 The contracts provided that both signers and non-signers would retain tenure rights, 3 and contained a clause stating that all signing teachers were to refrain from participating in any work
stoppage, sit-in, or strike." Teachers were not required to sign, and non62
signers were to continue employment under provisions of the School Code;
however, tenured teachers who did not sign the new contracts were to receive the salary they had been paid in the prior school year. 3
The plaintiffs, twenty-three tenured teachers, did not sign the contracts
offered them by the board of education. The plaintiffs nevertheless taught

55. Id. at 696-97, 360 N.E.2d at 106.
56. id.
57. Id. at 699, 360 N.E.2d at 108.
58. Id. at 698, 360 N.E.2d at 107.
59. 81 111. 2d at 245, 408 N.E.2d at 715. The defendant, Board of Education of Mascouth
Community Unit School District No. 19, unilaterally adopted a salary schedule for the 19771978 school year and sent the schedule, along with an employment contract, to its tenured
teachers. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Bond v. Board of Educ., 81 111. 2d 242, 408 N.E.2d 714
(1980).
60. 81 Ill. 2d at 245, 408 N.E.2d at 715.
61. Brief for Petitioner at 28, The contract provided: "The parties hereto acknowledge that
they are each aware of their legal and moral duty and obligation to provide a full school term of
education for the students .... The Teacher will not participate in a work stoppage, sit-in,
strike or any activity similar thereto.
...
Id. (emphasis added).
62. 81 111. 2d at 245, 408 N.E.2d at 715. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
63. 81 111. 2d at 245, 408 N.E.2d at 715. The board also sent a tender letter accompanying
the contract of employment. The letter contained the following paragraph: "In the event the
contract is not signed by an individual teacher, the Board guarantees that all of the teachers

rights, under the school code, shall be accorded the teacher; including the right to receive the
same salary received during the 1976-77 school term." Brief for Petitioner at 7.
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classes during the 1977-1978 school year and performed the same duties as
the teachers who had signed the new contracts.'
Consistent with the language of the contract, however, the plaintiffs were paid the same salaries as
they had been paid during the 1976-1977 school year. Subsequently, the
plaintiffs initiated an action for a declaratory judgment seeking compensation
under the salary schedule in effect for the 1977-1978 school year. 4 The
plaintiffs argued that the no-strike clause in the new contracts gave the defendant nothing it could not already expect, because teachers as public employees were prohibited by law from striking.'
A promise to refrain from
doing something one is already bound by law not to do, the plaintiffs averred, cannot constitute valid consideration. 7 Thus, the plaintiffs argued that
the no-strike clause could not serve as valid consideration within the employment contracts, and that the payment of a higher salary to teachers who
signed those contracts was arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory, and
based upon an improper classification. 64
The defendant contended that the no-strike clause was valuable consideration and, consequently, that paying the signing teachers a higher salary than
the non-signing teachers was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."
The circuit court held in favor of the plaintiffs, and the appellate court, by
summary order, affirmed." The Illinois Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal and reversed.
RATIONALE EMPLOYED IN BOND

The defendant in Bond contended that Davis should control, 7 because the
Davis facts were "on all fours" with the facts presented in Bond."2 The
plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that Littrell should control." 3 Before addressing the main issue of whether a no-strike clause was valid
consideration," the Illinois Supreme Court first sought to resolve the apparM

64. 81 I11.2d at 245, 408 N.E.2d at 715.
65. Id. at 244, 408 N.E.2d at 715.
66. Id. at 246, 408 N.E.2d at 715. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
67. 81 111. 2d at 246, 408 N.E.2d at 715. See notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra.
68. 81 111. 2d at 246, 408 N.E.2d at 715.
69. Id. at 245-46, 408 N.E.2d at 715.
70. Bond v. Board of Educ., 71 111. App. 3d 1115, 392 N.E.2d 1389 (5th Dist. 1979). The
appellate court held that '[a] teacher's agreement not to strike could not serve as valid consideration for a contract 'Had they executed the contracts, plaintiffs would not have bound themselves to do any more than they were already obliged to do, nor than they did in fact do.'
Littrell, 45 I11.App. 3d [at 698], 360 N.E.2d [at] 107." Brief for the Petitioner 41 app. A, at 3.
71. 81 I11.2d at 246, 408 N.E.2d at 716.
72. Brief for the Petitioner at 4.
73. 81 11. 2d at 246, 408 N.E.2d at 716.
74. There was a secondary contention by the plaintiffs that because they were not paid the
salary increase which signing teachers were paid, .they had been subjected to a reduction in
pay. Id. at 246, 408 N.E.2d at 715. The court briefly addressed this contention in a closing
paragraph of the opinion. It disagreed with the plaintiffs contention that their salaries were
reduced in contravention of § 24-11 of the Illinois School Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §
24-11 (1979). 81 111. 2d at 250, 408 N.E.2d at 718. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were
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ent conflict between Littrell and Davis. After a lengthy discussion of both
cases, the court, however, concluded that neither Littrell nor Davis was
relevant to the case before it.7 5 On the contrary, Bond presented the issue
of whether a no-strike clause could serve as consideration in tenured public
school teachers' contracts, an issue not directly addressed in either Littrell
parallelor Davis. Therefore, the court found that the facts of Bond neither
6
led nor were in conflict with the Littrell or Davis holdings.1
To resolve the main issue presented in Bond, the court reiterated the
long-standing Illinois no-strike policy as demonstrating the illegality of public school teachers' strikes. Relying primarily upon the mandate of the Illinois
Constitution, 77 the court emphasized that the no-strike policy was necessary
to avoid disruptions in education and to provide an element of stability in
school boards' planning and budgetary responsibilities. 78 The court recognized, however, that the prohibition of strikes by public employees had been
largely ignored. 79 The court also expressed deep concern that school boards
would exhaust their budgets and be unable to provide quality education if
illegal strikes by teachers continued. 0 The court held, therefore, that a
no-strike clause is valid consideration for paying signing teachers a higher
salary than non-signing teachers. 8 '
The holding was based on the notion that the no-strike clause was a "practical benefit to the defendant," and by refusing to sign the contract, the
plaintiffs avoided a personal committment not to strike.8" Furthermore, the
clause was "the embodiment of public policy-as a reasonable and practical
consideration extracted by a board to better enable it to perform its constitutionally mandated duties."' Having concluded that the no-strike clause was
valid consideration, the court further reasoned that a reasonable difference
existed between signing and non-signing teachers to justify a salary
differential.'4 Therefore, when the plaintiffs declined to provide such additional consideration by refusing to sign the contracts offered to them,5 they

informed that if they did not sign the contract, they would have the right to be paid a salary
determined under the School Code. Under the School Code, they were entitled to continued
employment at a salary and under the terms of the prior year's contract. They did, in fact,
continue at that salary. Thus, the court dismissed the argument that the plaintiff's salary had
been improperly reduced. Id.
75. 81 111. 2d at 247, 408 N.E.2d at 716.
76. Id. at 246, 408 N.E.2d at 716.
77. See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
78. 81 11. 2d at 248, 408 N.E.2d at 717.
79. Id. See note 88 infra.
80. 81 111. 2d at 248-49, 408 N.E.2d at 717.
81. In the courts' words, "[because] we have found a no-strike provision to be consideration,
it follows that the classification between signers 'and non-signers is reasonable and justifies the
salary differential." Id. at 249, 408 N.E.2d at 717.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See notes 32 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
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justifiably received a salary based upon the previous year's salary schedule
while retaining employment under the provisions of the School Code.'
CRMCISM

AND ANALYSIS

In holding that a no-strike clause can serve as valid consideration in public
school teachers' contracts, the Bond court made an indirect attempt to
effectuate the Illinois no-strike policy. By the court's own admission, however, this policy has been repeatedly ignored by striking public school
teachers. 8 Indeed, it is common knowledge that teachers repeatedly break
the law by participating in rigorous strike activity, regardless of the clarity or
frequency of judicial decisions declaring strikes illegal.8 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, continues to cling to the hope that the no-strike
policy can foster stability in the Illinois educational system. 9
In its quest to promote this stability, the Bond court ignored a traditional
principle of contract law. A promise not to do something that one may not in
any case lawfully do cannot form valid consideration because it creates no
new obligation on the promisor's part.'M This principle has been recognized
in Illinois courts 9' as well as in many other state courts.' In Bond, the only
86. ILL.

REV. STAT.,

ch. 122, § 24-11 (1979). See note 32 supra.

87. 81 I1l. 2d at 248, 408 N.E.2d at 717.
88. It is interesting to note that in 1966, one year after Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 I11.
2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965), was decided, strikes by governmental employees more than

tripled, increasing from 42 in 1965 to 142 in 1966. [1980]

GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.

(BNA) RF-

71:1014. Similarly in 1975, the year after City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 I11.2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513
(1974), was decided, Illinois ranked second among the fifty states in the number of public school
teachers strikes. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN
GOVERNMENT, 1975, Report 483, at 16-18 (1977). See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra.
89. 81 111. 2d at 248, 408 N.E.2d at 717.
90. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 132 (3d ed. 1957). The general rule is that a promise to
do what the promisor is already legally bound to do cannot constitute consideration.
91. Moehling v. O'Neil Constr. Co., 20111. 2d 255, 266, 170 N.E.2d 100, 106 (1960) (the law
is well settled that a promise to do something one is already obligated to do is no consideration);
Trisko v. Vignola Furniture Co., 12 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035, 299 N.E.2d 421, 425 (1st Dist.
1973) (defendant's promise to repair unmerchantable goods sold in violation of express warranties no consideration for plaintiff's return promise not to sue because defendant was already
under a legal duty to repair the goods); Plain v. Golden, 334 Ill. App. 264, 78 N.E.2d 822 (1st
Dist. 1948) (no consideration when tenants promised to pay the landlord one-half the cost of
installing fire escapes since fire escapes were required by law); Macks v. Macks, 329 Ill. App.
144, 152, 67 N.E.2d 505, 509 (1st Dist. 1946) (it is firmly established that a promise to do
something that one is already obligated to do is no consideration and creates no new obligation).
92. See, e.g., Bowers v. Alexandria Bank, 75 Ind. App. 345, 130 N.E. 808 (1920) (husband's
promise to pay his wife to resume her marital duties is no consideration for her return promise
not to abandon him); Kovacich v. Metals Bank & Trust Co., 139 Mont. 449, 326 P.2d 639 (1961)
(agreement of buyers to pay what they were obligated to pay under a sales contract is no
consideration for a return promise by seller not to repossess); Rhoades v. Rhoades, 40 Ohio
App. 2d 559, 321 N.E.2d 242 (1974) (defendant's promise to pay a sum less than what he was
already obligated to pay was not consideration for plaintiff's return promise); McLeod v. Sandy
Island Corp., 265 S.C. 1, 216 S.E.2d 746 (1975) (father's promise to fulfill his legal duty to
support his minor daughter is no consideration to support a contract); Baggs v. Anderson, 528
P.2d 141 (Utah 1974) (defendant's promise to pay future alimony support was no consideration
for plaintiff's return promise since defendant was already obligated to pay $200 per month).
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additional promise a signing teacher gave the school board was a promise
not to strike.
Since public school teachers' strikes are illegal in Illinois, the
teachers were already legally bound not to strike. Therefore, their promise
not to strike could not under established contract principles serve as valid
9
consideration for the school board's return promise to pay a higher salary. 1
Absent valid consideration," the payment of a lower salary to the plaintiffs
merely because they refused to sign the new contracts must be considered
unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, and consequently unjustified.W A
no-strike clause is better viewed as a mere formality, inserted into public
employment contracts as a reminder that the law prohibits any strike activity
by public employees.97
In addition, no-strike clauses will not solve the growing problem of disruptive and illegal teachers' strikes. The prevention of strikes by public
school teachers will not be accomplished while the court maintains the pres-

93. The plaintiffs and defendant agreed in their briefs that in order for the salary differential
to be based on a reasonable classification, there must be some provision in the contract which
gave the board additional consideration to justify paying signers a higher salary than nonsigners. The plaintiffs argued that because the only additional obligation imposed was the nostrike clause and because it is illegal for Illinois public employees to strike, the clause could not
serve as valid consideration, and paying signing teachers a higher salary was arbitrary, discriminatory, and based upon an unreasonable classification. Brief for Respondent at 9-13, Bond v.
Board of Educ., 81 Ill. 2d 242, 408 N.E.2d 714 (1980). The defendant argued that the additional obligation of the no-strike clause was a personal assurance to the board that the individual
teacher would be on duty for the entire school year, that this promise gave the board something
of value, regardless of the pre-existing policy that public employees strikes were illegal, and
that value permitted the board to pay a higher salary to those teachers who agreed not to strike.
Brief for Petitioner at 32.
94. Justice Ward so argued in his dissent. He also recognized that the majority breached
these simple contract principles to reach a decision comporting with the established no-strike
policy. Although Bond may have been a "hard case," the applicable law was clear. "Strikes by
public employees violate the express public policy of this state and are unlawful. The promise
here was simply to forbear from acting illegally. The promise of a forbearance already imposed
by law cannot be a sufficient consideration .
81 111. 2d at 251-52, 408 N.E.2d at 718
(Ward, J., dissenting).
95. While discussing the validity of the no-strike clause in the Davis contract, the Littrell
court reasoned that a no-strike clause could not serve as valid consideration. The Court stated:
We note parenthetically that we cannot understand how such a contractual provision [a no-strike clause], by which one of the parties agrees not to do what he is
already bound by law not to do, could serve as valid consideration. It is unlawful for
public employees to strike in the State of Illinois.
45 I11.App. 3d at 694 n.2, 360 N.E.2d at 104 n.2.
96. See notes 35-37'supra. In Bond, the board exceeded its discretionary powers and
granted a salary increase based upon invalid .consideration. Arguably, therefore, there exists an
unconstitutional classification between signing and non-signing tenured teachers and the plaintiffs should have been paid the amounts they were entitled to under the 1977-1978 salary
schedule.
97. See Note, Public Sector Bargaining, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 209, 218 (1976).
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ent no-strike policy in Illinois.' This absolute prohibition of the right to
strike has not only failed to reduce strike activity, but has distorted the give
and take bargaining relationship necessary to implement fair contracts between teachers and school boards.
The denial of the right to strike has the effect of weighting the bargaining
process heavily in favor of the school board " because the board maintains all
the bargaining leverage, while teachers are left with none. This imbalance
creates an inherent bargaining advantage for school boards which can ignore
teachers' demands by using the absolute no-strike policy."°° In other words,
the absolute no-strike policy in Illinois blankets a school board with a fortified bargaining position, a security that enhances the likelihood of ignoring
teacher demands, and in turn increasing the urge to strike.'
Therefore,
while effectuating the Illinois no-strike policy and while allowing no-strike
clauses to serve as valid consideration in employment contracts, the supreme
court has actually widened the negotiating gap between school board and
teacher. This judicially imposed alienation cannot create stability in an educational system that depends upon the cooperation of school boards and
teachers. Unilateral contracts that do not result from fair negotiations can
only create further teacher animosity toward school boards, and may ultimately lead to sustained teachers' strikes.
IMPACT OF THE BOND DECISION

Ironically, although the Bond court recognized public school teachers' blatant defiance of the Illinois no-strike policy,"w its decision will do nothing to
prevent future strikes. Undoubtedly, this decision will encourage school
boards to exact a personal commitment from teachers not to strike by inserting no-strike clauses into all tenured teachers' contracts. It is unlikely,
however, that public school teachers will obey these no-strike clauses. Recent strike activity demonstrates the willingness of teachers to violate the

98. For general evaluations of public employees' right to strike and possible strike alternatives, see Bers, The Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 21 LAB. L.J. 482 (1970); Burton, Can
Public Employees Be Given the Right to Strike?, 21 LAB. L.J. 472, 478 (1970); Howlett, The
Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 53 Cm. B. REc. 108, 109 (1971).
99. See Timberlance Regional School Dist. v. Timberline Regional Educ. Ass'n, 144 N.H.
245, 249, 317 A.2d 555, 557 (1974). See also Moskow & McLennan, Teachers Strikes and
Dispute Settlement Policy, 14 N.Y.L.F. 281, 287 (1968) (under no-strike laws, public employees
can merely make suggestions or recommendations which the employer is free to disregard without fear of reprisal).
100. See Rosenberg, Teacher Strikes: A Proposed Solution, 16 URB. L. ANN. 331, 354 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenberg].
101. Bilik, Toward Public Sector Equality: Extending the Strike Privilege, 21 LAB. L.J. 338,
347 (1970) (no-strike laws tend to make the employer dull to the danger signals of a pending
strike, thus enhancing the likelihood of a bargaining breakdown) [hereinafter cited as Bilik].
102. 81 111. 2d at 248, 408 N.E.2d at 717. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
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law and suffer the punishment " when their frustration with school boards
results in a negotiation impasse. "
The broader implications of Bond's reasoning may sanction contracts with
tenured teachers that are unreasonably favorable to the school board as long
as the provisions are a "practical benefit" 115 to the board in executing its
consitutionally mandated function. Consequently, the school board is
assured of complete control over contract formation, placing tenured
teachers in a situation with limited options. Short of resigning, a tenured
teacher can either sign new contracts with unfavorable provisions or receive
a lower salary than co-workers who are performing the same job.'06 Yet, the
exercise of any of these alternatives may cause increased tension between
school boards and teacher unions and continue to weaken the role teachers
play in the contract negotiation process."'
Ultimately, without the right to strike, teachers may have no power to
influence the contract negotiations between themselves and the board.
Without such power, tenured public school teachers are left with the mere
illusion of choice-accept a board's unfavorable contract terms or participate
in an illegal strike. Given the growth of teachers' unions and the regard with
which teachers have considered the no-strike policy, public school teachers
are likely to choose the latter.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE ILLINOIS No-STRIKE POLICY

Because the absolute prohibition of the right to strike has in the past
failed to retard illegal strike activity,"'0 public school teachers should be

103. Illegal strike activities are subject to injunction, which if disobeyed, can be punished by
the court in the form of fines or imprisonment. The ultimate sanction for unlawful work stoppage is discharge of the striking employees. Whether cast in terms of a breach of contract,
unauthorized absence, insubordination, or statutory penalty, such sanctions have been upheld.
W. VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLs 226 (1980). Other disciplinary measures that have been
employed are loss of seniority or tenure, freeze of salary and cancellation of employer pension
contributions. Halligan, Enjoining Public Employees' Strikes: Dealing With Recalcitrant Defendants, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 298, 316 (1969).
104. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra.
105. 81 111. 2d at 249, 408 N.E.2d at 717.
106. These options, in reality, are the only choices left to tenured teachers after Bond, other
than participation in illegal strike activity.
107. For a look into the problems encountered by public school teachers in collective bargaining with school boards, see Clink, supra note 18, at 629-40; F. CASSELL & J. BARON, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CASES IN PUBLIC POLICY 5-23 (1975); ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, ILLINOIS SCHOOL LAW § 18.15 (1977). See also Board of Educ. v.
Johnson, 21111. App. 482, 487, 315 N.E.2d 634, 639 (1st Dist. 1974) (the court quoted Miller,
The Alice-in-Wonderland World of Public Employee Bargaining, 50 CHI. B. REC. 223, 225
(1969), in observing that a bargaining situation that leaves the final decision on all negotiated
matters to the school board's discretion presents "a condition which any experienced negotiator
in the private sector quickly recognizes as being totally inconsistent with both the concept and
the practice of collective bargaining").
108. See notes 9-12, & 88 and accompanying text supra.
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afforded a limited or qualified right to strike."
Such a right would equalize
the bargaining positions of both parties and avoid the foreseeable strikes
caused by the imposition of unilateral contract terms. The "non-stoppage"
and "graduated" strike alternatives seem to offer the most feasible
solutions. "'

Non-stoppage Strike Alternative
During a non-stoppage strike, operations continue as usual while both
sides negotiate and attempt to settle contract differences. While the "strike"
is in effect, both the teachers and the school board make payments based on
a specified percentage of total cash wages into a special penalty fund.I"
Therefore, in addition to paying regular wages, the employer deposits into
the fund an extra amount, equal to what the employees have foregone. To
be effective, this central fund must be beyond the recapture of either
party. "12 The teachers' union has the option of increasing the amount of the
contribution, thereby escalating pressure on the board to promote settlement. More importantly, while both parties are under pressure to settle,
educational services are not disrupted.
The non-stoppage strike provides public school teachers with the leverage
they need to bargain effectively with the various school boards. It not only
applies pressure on the public officials who deal directly with the teachers'
union, but also attracts the attention of the executive branch and the local
legislature.13 Furthermore, the non-stoppage strike provides incentives for
109. While two commentators propose an absolute right to strike, Bilik, supra note 101, at
356; Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 943,
951-52 (1969), the proposal for a qualified right to strike is more persuasive. See Bernstein,
Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 83 HARV. L. REV. 459 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Bernstein]. See also Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 356-58.
110. Bernstein, supra note 109, at 469-75; Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 356-58. It should
be noted that the non-stoppage and graduated strike proposals should be a part of a comprehensive public labor relations scheme. This scheme would provide protection of employees against
reprisal for collective activity, procedures for ascertaining appropriate bargaining units, elections
to determine employee preferences, recognition and mandatory bargaining, mediation procedures for bargaining disputes, and fact-finding with recommendations in the case of bargaining
deadlock. Bernstein, supra note 109, at 469 n.34.
111. A suggested starting percentage could be 10% of the employees' total wages. As additional pressure is needed, the union might opt to raise this percentage to gain added bargaining
leverage. Bernstein supra note 109, at 470.
112. One problem raised by the use of the non-stoppage strike is the allocation of the penalty
fund into which employer and employee will contribute after dispute settlement. To insure that
the loss actually disciplines the parties, the fund would have to be beyond recapture. One
commentator recommends that a special committee have control over fund allocation and preferably funnel it back into the school system on projects that would not directly benefit either
side. Id. at 472-73.
113. The most direct effect of a non-stoppage strike is the lost revenue suffered by the school
boards. Because most school boards have limited budgets, every day a non-stoppage strike
continues the boards are under increased pressure to settle with teachers so as not to lose
further revenue. This pressure would emanate from various governmental officials. In turn,
these officials are directly pressured by the public at large because these officials are elected by
the public. Id. at 471.
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these various bodies of government to seek settlement and to take serious
steps in the recognition of teachers' demands."' Finally, because these

strikes would not be illegal and would not deprive students of an education,
the merits of the dispute would be clearly delineated, rather than clouded
by the hysteria and frustration now typical of illegal strikes."'

Graduated Strike Alternative
When a non-stoppage strike is insufficient to produce settlement, more
direct pressure may be applied by the use of the graduated strike. In a
graduated strike, the employees stop working during portions of their usual
work week and suffer comparable reductions of wages."' For example, during the first week or two of the strike, the teachers would not report to work
for half of a day. The absences would increase in stages as additional pressure is needed."' Thus, the teachers' union could halt educational services
for longer periods to secure responsive action from governmental officials.
The graduated strike alternative allows decreases in educational service
without the shock and total deprivation that accompanies conventional
strikes. Citizens angered by the disruption of their childrens' education
could apply pressure on teachers and the school board to promote settlement. The school boards, however, would not be stripped of options in the
negotiation procedure. If they are financially burdened, the boards could
limit the teachers' unions to the use of the graduated strike which only results in a loss of services."' If the service is so essential that cessation is not
possible,"' the boards could limit the unions to the expensive non-stoppage
strike.
The Illinois courts and legislature should adopt a new policy to control
public school teachers' strikes.' 20 A qualified right to strike, utilizing the
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Bernstein, supra note 109, at 474; Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 357.
117. Bernstein, supra note 109, at 475.
118. Id.
119. Id. Other essential services provided by public employees, such as fire and police protection, are two areas where a strike immediately endangers the safety of the public.
120. Currently in five states, public employee strikes, especially teachers strikes, are permissible if they do not create a clear or present danger or threat to the health or safety of the public.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(c) (1975) ("A strike may not be enjoined unless it can be shown that it
has begun to threaten the health, safety or welfare of the public .... "); HAWAII REv. STAT. §
89-12(c) (1976) (where the strike occurring ... endangers the public health or safety . . . [and]
[t]he board finds that there is imminent or present danger to the health and safety of the public,
the board shall set requirements that must be 6omplied with to avoid . . . such imminent or
present danger"); OR. REv. STAT. § 243.726 (1979-80) (with the exception of police, fire fighters,
or guards at correctional institutions or mental hospitals, strikes are permissible if they do not
create "a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public"); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1980) ("[a) strike by public employees ... shall
not be prohibited unless or until such a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the
health, safety or welfare of the public"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2010 (Supp. 1980-81) ("[a]ny
restraining order or injunction issued by a court . . . shall prohibit only a specific act or acts
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graduated and non-stoppage strike methods, balances the bargaining power
of teachers and school board and creates a serious negotiating process that
can satisfy the needs and demands of both sides.'
This in turn may reduce
the strikes and work stoppages that have plagued Illinois throughout the past
fifteen years. 11
CONCLUSION

In implementing its no-strike policy, the court not only rendered an illreasoned opinion, but perhaps undermined the very policy it wished to
promote. As long as public employee strikes remain illegal in Illinois, a nostrike provision cannot serve as valid consideration in a contract. Alternatives do exist to ensure that both school boards and teachers have equal
positions at the bargaining table. Without this equality teachers will refuse
to accept one-sided contracts and will continue to disobey the no-strike policy. Therefore, either legislative or judicial action is needed to provide public school teachers with an effective bargaining tool, while at the same time
allowing the school boards sufficient power to operate an efficient educational system.
Vincent S. Oleszkiewicz

expressly determined .. .to pose a clear and present danger"). Furthermore, strikes by public
employees in these states are only permissible after the processes of mediation or arbitration have
failed.
In Minnesota, violations of certain arbitration procedures by public employers can be used by
public employees as a defense to an otherwise illegal strike. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64(7) (West
Supp. 1980). The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted a Montana statute to give public
employees the same right to strike as employees in the private sector. State v. Public Employees
Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974). Although the statute in question did not
apply to teachers when this decision was issued, the statute has since been amended to bring
them under its coverage. MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 59-1602(2) (Supp. 1977). Finally, Wisconsin
allows all public employees, with the exception of police and fire fighters, the right to strike if
authorized by specific impasse procedures. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(1) (West Supp. 197980). See Jascourt, Responses to Union Concerted Activity: An Overview, 8 J.L. & Eouc. 57,
61-70 (1979).
121. See notes 98-101 and accompanying text supra.
122. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra.

